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In Search of Clemency Procedures
We Can Live With: What Process is Due in
Capital Clemency Proceedings After
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard?
Brian S. Clarke*
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari for the final time.
All state and federal appeals have been exhausted. The execution date has been
set. There is only one thing that can save the death row inmate from the ultimate
punishment: the proverbial call from the governor and a grant of executive
clemency.
This scene, although a veritable Hollywood liche, is being played out in
prisons across America with increasing frequency. As ofJuly 1, 1998, there were
3,474 men and women on death row in America.' In 1996, with the passage of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19962 ("AEDPA")
Congress sought to "streamline" the federal habeas process and expedite execu-
tions.' In the words of one commentator, AEDPA has "eviscerated... the once
great Writ [of Habeas Corpus]."4 The changes wrought by AEDPA have created
a federal habeas system in which "results are more important than process, [ ]
finality is more important than fairness, [and] it is more important to get on with
executions than [to] determin[e] whether convictions and sentences were fairly
and reliably obtained."' The current system "facilitates executions, but it does
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A., University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thank you to Professor Penny J. White for her inspirational
leadership. Also, many thanks to Karen Fredenburg, Business Manager of the Washington & Lee
Law Review, for her assistance in getting this issue of the CAPITAL DEFENSEJOURNAL to press.
1. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, "Facts About the Death Penalty,"
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpic5.htm> (citing NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row
USA, July 1, 1998). As of October 21, 1998, 54 men and women have been executed in 1998 and
a total of 486 have been executed since 1976. Id
2. Pub.L.No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153).
3. See 28 U.S.C. Tide 153, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L.No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
4. Stephen B. Bright, Death Penal* yMoratorium Fairness, Integriv at Stake: Soeaking Out in Favor
oftheABA's Position, 13-SUM CRIM. JusT. 28, 34 (1998).
5. Id at 35. See also Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond, The Incredible Shtinking Writ: Habeas Corpus
Under theAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penai A a of 1996, CAP. DEP.J., vol. 9, no. 1, p. 52 (I 996)
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so only at the price of being powerless to correct injustice in many instances."6
In this environment, the role that executive clemency must play in the realm
of capital punishment is becoming increasingly important. Initially, this article
will briefly examine the statutory clemency schemes currently in use in states that
have the death penalty. Next, it will discuss the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to capital clemency proceedings. Finally, it will seek to determine exactly
what process is due in capital clemency proceedings.
II. The Lay of the Land- Current Statutory Clemengy Schemes
All of the thirty-eight states7 that authorize capital punishment also have
constitutional or statutory provisions for clemency! In the vast majority of
(discussing the changes made to the federal habeas process byAEDPA); Mary E. Eade, The Incredible
Shrinking Writ, Part II: Habeas Corpus Under the Anti-Terriism and Effeative Death Penaly Aa of 1996,
CAP. DEF. J., vol. 9, no. 2, p. 55 (1997) (examining four early judicial interpretations of various
provisions of AEDPA); & Kimberly Woolley, Constitutional Interpretations of the Anti-Terorism Act's
Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1998) (discussing changes made by AEDPA
from a constitutional perspective).
6. Bright, supra note 4, at 35.
7. Currently, 38 states, the Federal Government, and the United States Military have the
death penalty with the total number of people on death row in each jurisdiction as of July 1, 1998:
Arizona (119), Alabama (167), Arkansas (41), California (503), Connecticut (5), Colorado (3),
Delaware (17), Florida (388), Georgia (121), Idaho (21), Indiana (44), Illinois (159), Kansas (2),
Kentucky (33), Louisiana (80), Maryland (18), Mississippi (64), Missouri (86), Montana (6), Nebraska
(11), New Hampshire (0), New Jersey (15), New Mexico (4), New York (1), Nevada (89), North
Carolina (205), Ohio (183), Oklahoma (141), Oregon (24), Pennsylvania (220), South Carolina (70),
South Dakota (2), Tennessee (101), Texas (431), Utah (11), Virginia (44), Washington (17),
Wyoming (1), United States Government (19), & United States Military (8). DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, "Facts About the Death Penalty," <http://www.essential.org/dpic/
dpic5.htm> (citing NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row USA, July 1, 1998).
8. ALA. CONST., AMDT. 38,ALA. CODE § 15-18-100 (1995);ARIZ. CONST., art. V, 5 5, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. 5 31-443,31-445 (1996), McGee v. Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 376
P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1962) (holding that due process requires full hearings of all clemency applications);
ARK. CONST., art. VI, § 18, ARK. CODE ANN. % 5-4-607,16-93-204 (1997); CAL. CONST., art. V, §
8, CAL PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 4800-4807, CAL GOVT. CODE ANN. S 12030(a) (West 1992); COLO.
CONST., art. IV, § 7, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-17-101, 16-17-102 (1997); CONN. CONST., art. IV, §
13, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-26 (1997); DEL CONsT., art. VII, § 1, DEL CODE ANN., Tit. 29, § 2103
(1997); FLA. CONST., art. IV, § 8, FLA. STAT. § 940.01 (1997), FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. .T. 27,
App. (1997); GA. CONST., art. IV, § 2,1 2, GA. CODE ANN. ]§ 42-9-20, 42-9-42 (1997); IDAHO
CONST., art. IV, § 7, IDAHO CODE % 20-240 (1997); ILL CONST., art. V, § 12,730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/3-3-13 (1997); IND. CONST., art. V, § 17, IND. CODE §§ 11-9-2-1 to 11-9-2-4, 35-38-6-8 (1993);
KAN. CONST., art. I, § 7, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3701 (1995); KY. CONST., § 77; LA. CONST., art. IV,
§ 5(E), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572 (WEST 1992), LA. ADMIN. CODE tit 22, §§ 101 to 113; MD.
CONST., art. II, § 20, MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 77 (1996), and art. 41, § 4-513 (1997); MISS. CONST.,
art. V, § 124, MiSs. CODE ANN. § 47-5-115 (1981); MO. CONST., art IV, § 7, Mo. REV. STAT. §§
217.220,217.800,552.070 (1994); MONT. CONST., art. VI, § 12, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-301
to 46-23-316 (1994); NEB. CONST., art. IV, § 13, NEB. REV. STAT. % 83-1,127 to 83-1,132 (1994);
NEV. CONST., art. V, § 13, NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.080 (1995), NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 213, §§
213.010 to 213.210 (1998); N.H. CONST., ir. 2, art. 52,N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:23 (1988); N.J.
CONST., art. V, § 2, 1, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167-4, 2A:167-12 (West 1985); N.M. CONST., art. V,
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states, the ultimate power to grant or deny clemency is vested in the executive.
Several states, however, have split the clemency power between the Governor
and an advisory board, often a parole board.
Twenty-five states require some sort of mandatory action by either the
Governor, the parole board or both. Typically, these states require either an
investigation by the parole board, a hearing before the parole board, or both:
thirteen states require an investigation;9 eleven states require a hearing;10 and
three states require both." Four of the twenty-five states that require some
mandatory action require only that the Governor or the board "consider"' 2 or
"review"' the application.
Included in the group of states that require mandatory action on petitions
for clemency are Florida, Georgia, and Texas, states which, like Virginia, are very
active capital punishers. 4 Many of the landmark Supreme Court decisions in this
realm have originated in these three states." In fact, Virginia's capital sentencing
§ 6, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-17 (1994); N.Y. CONST., art. IV, § 4, N.Y. EXEC. LAW % 15 to 19
(McKinney 1993); N.C. CONST., art. III, § 5(6), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 147-23 to 147-25 (1993); OHIO
CONST., art. III, § 1 1,OHIo REV. CODE ANN. % 2967.01 to 2967.12 (1996); OKLA. CONsT., art. VI,
§ 10, OKLA. STAT., Tit. 21, § 701.11 A (Supp. 1998); ORE. CONST., art. V, S 14, ORE. REV. STAT. §
144.640 TO 144.670 (1991); PA. CONST., art. IV, § 9, PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 61, § 2130 (Purdon
Supp.1992); S.C. CONST., art. IV,§ 14,S.C. CODEANN. § 24-21-910 to 24-21-1000 (1977 and Supp.
1997); S.D. CONST., art. IV, § 3, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS % 23A-27A-20 to 23A-27A-21,24-14-1 to
24-14-7 (1988); TENN. CONST., art. III, § 6, TENN. CODE ANN. %§ 40-27-101 to 40-27-109 (1997),
TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1100-1-1 -.15 (1995); TEX. CONST., art. IV, § 11, TEX. CRIM. P. CODE
ANN., art. 48.01 (Supp. 1997), 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.57 to 143.59 (West 1998); UTAH
CONST., art. VII, § 12, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-5.5 (Supp.1 992), UTAH ADMIN. CODE §§ R671 -
312-1 to R671-312-3 (1998); VA. CONST., art. V, § 12, VA. CODE ANN. % 53.1-229 to 53.1-231
(1994); WASH. CONST., art. III, § 9, WASH. REv. CODE § 10.01.120 (1994); WYO. CONST., art. IV,
5, WYo. STAT. § 7-13-801 (1995).
9. This group of states includes Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. It is especially
interesting that both Florida and Georgia require mandatory investigations by their respective
clemency boards before the application is considered.
10. This group includes Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Utah. The type of hearing that the inmate is entitled to differs
from state to state. For example, Pennsylvania and Delaware require full public hearings. PA.
CONST., art. IV, § 9, PA. STAT. ANN.,Tit. 61, § 2130 (Purdon Supp.1992); & DEL. CONST., art. VII,
1, DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 29, § 2103 (1997).
11. Arizona, Indiana and Ohio require both a hearing and an investigation. Arizona, which
requires both an investigation and a full adversarial hearing, provides inmates with the greatest
degree of procedural protection. SeeARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 31-443,31-445 (1996) & McGee v. Arizona
State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 376 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1962) (holding that due process requires
full hearings of all clemency applications). The Arizona Supreme Court was the first court to
recognize that the Due Process Clause applies in clemency proceedings.
12. Texas, Nebraska, and Wyoming require that the board or the governor "consider" the
application. Wyoming also requires that the Governor give notice to the district attorney in the
county where the inmate was convicted.
13. Maryland requires that the board "review" the application for clemency.
14. Texas, Virginia and Florida are the leaders in the number of executions per year.
15. The trio of cases that declared the death penalty unconstitutional in 1972 were from
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scheme was largely adopted from those of Georgia and Texas. The language of
Virginia's "future dangerousness" aggravator was modeled on that of Texas
following the Supreme Court's decision inJurek v. Texas.6 Similarly, the language
of Virginia's "vileness" aggravator was copied verbatim from that of Georgia
following the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia."
In Florida, one of the top three capital punishers in the United States, the
Florida Parole Commission is required to "conduct a thorough and detailed
investigation into all factors relevant to the issue of clemency" in every clemency
application.'" The investigation must include, among other things, "an interview
with the inmate (who may have legal counsel present) by at least three members
of the Commission."" The Commissioners who personally interviewed the
inmate are then required to issue a report that includes their findings and conclu-
sions.' Following the issuance of this report, any Commission member or the
Governor may request a hearing to be held at the Commission's next meeting.2'
Georgia and Texas. See Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, & Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972). Conversely, three of the four decisions that essentially brought back the death
penalty in 1976 were from these three states. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976); & Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96
S.Ct. 2960 (1976). Additionally, in the last three years, the United States Supreme Court's capital
jurisprudence has focused in very large part on Virginia. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757
(1998); O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997); Gray v. Netherland, 116 S.Ct. 2074 (1996); &
Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S.Ct. 283 (1995). For the October 1998 term, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in two Virginia cases. See Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420
(4th Cir.) (unpublished disposition), cert. granted sub nona, Strickler v. Greene, 119 S.Ct. 40 (1998); &
Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va.), cert. granted sub nora, Lilly v. Virginia, No. 98-5881,
1998 WL 596783 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998).
16. 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct 2950 (1976). Virginia's "future dangerousness" aggravator reads
as follows: "a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) .. .find
[beyond a reasonable doubt] that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society...." VA. CODE § 19.2-
264.2 (1997). The Court in Jurek approved one of Texas's aggravating factors that read as follows:
"whether [the evidence eitablished beyond a reasonable doubt that] there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2955 (1976) (quoting TEX. CRIM. P.
CODE art. 37.071(b)(2) (Supp. 1975-1976)).
17. 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976). Virginia's "vileness" aggravator reads as follows: "a
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1). .. find [beyond a reason-
able doubt] .. .that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or
an aggravated battery to the victim.. . ." VA. CODE S 19.2-264.2 (1997). The Court in Gregg
approved one of Georgia's aggravating factors that read as follows: "The offense... was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,165 n.9, 96 S.Ct. 2909,2921 n.9
(1976) (quoting GA. CODE § 27-2534.1 (b)(7) (Supp. 1975)).






WHAT PROCESS IS DUE IN CLEMENCY?
At the hearing, "the attorneys for the state and the inmate may present oral
argument each not to exceed 15 minutes." 2 Florida's clemency scheme provides
inmates with several important procedural protections: namely the right to have
their applications thoroughly investigated and the right to speak directly with a
members of the Commission. Both Georga and Texas require consideration and
some investigation of clemency requests.' While not nearly as protective as the
procedures used in Florida, these clemency schemes ensure that, at a minimum,
the application is reviewed and considered.
Eleven states, including Virginia, require no mandatory action by the
governor or board.24 These states afford inmates absolutely no "process" and
give the executive virtually unfettered discretion. In all but two of these eleven
states, investigations into applications for clemency may be undertaken only at the
direction of the governor. There is no guaranty in any of these states that the
Governor will even look at the petition for clemency. The remainder of this
article will focus on the what process is due in clemency proceedings and whether
Virginia's clemency statute comports with these minimum requirements.
II. Does the Due Process Clause Appy to Capital Ckmeny Proceedings?
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our
Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted., 26 Despite this
recognition, however, the Court held in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumscbat
2 7
that the Due Process Clause28 did not apply in non-capital clemency proceedings
because there is no constitutionally protected interest in such proceedings. '9 The
Court reasoned that because an inmate's "liberty" interest was obviated when a
valid conviction was obtained," any interest the inmate had in clemency was
22. Id
23. GA. CODE §§42-9-20&42-9-42 (1997), GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. § 475.3-.10(2)(b) (1998);
& TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN., art. 48.01 (Supp. 1997), 37 TEx. ADMIN. CODE % 143.43 to 143.59
(West 1998).
24. These states are Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.
25. In Virginia, the Virginia Parole Board may investigate an application for clemency either
at the Governor's request or of its own accord if"it believes action on the part of the Governor is
in the best interest of the Commonwealth." VA. CODE § 53.1-231 (1998). Oregon allows its parole
board to send information about the application to the Governor if it so desires. ORE. REV. STAT.
144.640 to 144.670 (1991).
26. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12, 113 S.Ct. 853, 866 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
27. 452 U.S. 458, 101 S.Ct. 2460 (1981).
28. The "Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
xiv, 5 1.
29. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465
(1981).
30. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 2464.
1998]
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"simply a unilateral hope."31 On its facts, Dumschat did not address the issue of
whether due process protections were required in capital clemency proceedings. 2
The majority of the lower courts that considered this issue, however, have held
that, based on Dumschat, the Due Process Clause does not apply to capital
clemency proceedings.3
In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,' the Supreme Court finally ad-
dressed this issue.3" However, there was no majority opinion on the issue of
whether due process protection applies to capital clemency proceedings.36 Chief
Justice Rehnquist delivered the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion in
which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy joined. 7 The ChiefJustice believed
that Dumschat applied to capital clemency proceedings and characterized a death
row inmate's clemency petition as a "unilateral hope" which was not subject to
Due Process protection. 8 He reasoned that the "Due Process Clause is not
31. Id at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 2465.
32. Dumschat dealt specifically with an inmate who was serving a sentence of life imprison-
ment. Mr. Dumschat was seeking to have his life sentence commuted by reducing the minimum
sentence he was required to serve prior to becoming eligible for parole. The Connecticut Board of
Pardons repeatedly turned down his applications for commutation without explanation. Mr.
Dumschat argued that the Board's failure to give him a written explanation for its actions violated
his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There was evidence that
the Board commuted the sentences of at least 75% of the "lifers" that applied for commutation.
33. See Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that, based on Dumschat, Due
Process Clause does not apply to capital clemency proceedings under Nebraska clemency scheme
because the inmate lacked a constitutionally protected interest); Joubert v. Nebraska Board of
Pardons, 87 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Due Process Clause does not apply to capital clemency proceedings under Kentucky clemency
scheme because the inmate lacked a constitutionally protected interest); Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d
1402 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that Due Process Clause does not apply to capital clemency proceed-
ings under Florida clemency scheme because the inmate lacked a constitutionally protected interest);
& Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
Due Process Clause does not apply to capital clemency proceedings under Arkansas clemency
scheme because the inmate lacked a constitutionally protected interest). ButseeWoratzeckv. Arizona
Board of Executive Clemency, 117 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that some minimal due process
standards should apply in capital clemency proceedings based on the inmate's interest in "life").
34. 118 S.Ct. 1244 (1998).
35. For a summary of the facts and procedural history of Woodard, see Case Note on Ohio
Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, CAP. DEF. J., vol. 10, no. 2, p. 10 (1998).
36. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion on the due process issue in which Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter joined. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion on the due process issue.
Therefore, Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Souter, Ginsberg, and Stevens make-up the majority of the
Court on the due process issue. The Chief Justice's opinion on the due process issue was joined
only by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. It does not constitute the opinion of
the Court.
37. All members of the Court joined Part III of the Chief Justice's opinion which held that
Ohio's procedure of offering an inmate an informal interview without his counsel present prior to
the clemency hearing did not violate the inmate's Fifth Amendment rights.
38. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 1250 (1998) (opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.).
[Vol. 11: 1
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violated where, as here, the procedures in question do no more than confirm that
the clemency... power is committed, as is our tradition, to the authority of the
executive."
39
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, in an opinion which was joined by
Justices Breyer, Souter and Ginsberg, concluded that "some minimal procedural
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings."4 Similarly, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the Due Process Clause requires some "minimal requirements" in
clemency proceedings." Thus, a majority of the Court agreed on two critical
points. First, the majority recognized that a "prisoner under a death sentence
remains a living person and consequently has [a constitutionally protected]
interest in his life."'42 Second, the majority held "that some minimal procedural
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. 43
These two conclusions will fundamentally alter clemency proceedings in
many states. This is the first time since the death penalty was re-instituted in
1976' that the Court has recognized the existence of a "life" interest in any
capital proceeding.45 Virtually all of the Court's due process cases have focused
on the "liberty"" and "property"4 7 interests. Thus, the Court's re-recognition of
the "life" interest represents a major shift for the Court. Further, the Court's
conclusion that "some minimal procedural due process safeguards are required
in clemency proceedings" will force many states, including Virginia, to reexamine
39. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1247 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
40. Id at 1253-1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part& concurring in the judgment).Justice
O'Connor concluded that Ohio's clemency procedures, which require a clemency investigation by
the State and guaranty the inmate notice and an opportunity to be heard, were sufficient to meet
the "minimal" requirements of Due Process. Id at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
concurring in the judgment).
41. Id at 1254 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the case should be remanded to the district court to consider whether Ohio's proce-
dures meet the minimum standards of Due Process.
42. Id at 1253 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment). See also
Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
43. Id at 1254 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment). See also id
at 1254-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
44. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976); & Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976).
45. Over the years, several commentators have suggested re-recognition of the "life" interest.
See Coleen E. Klasmeier, Note, Towards a New Understanding of Capital Cgmenty and Procedural Due
Process, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1507 (1995); & Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penaltfy Commutations:
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemeny, 27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201 (1993).
46. See Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465
(1981) (discussing "liberty" interest of an inmate serving a sentence of fife imprisonment).
47. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970) (discussing the applicability of
the Due Process Clause in welfare benefit termination proceedings based on the recipient's
"property" interest in the benefits); & Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)
(discussing the applicability of the Due Process Clause in social security benefit termination
proceedings based on the recipient's "property" interest in the benefits).
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their capital clemency procedures." This is particularly true in states like Virginia
whose clemency provisions guaranty absolutely no "process" whatsoever.
IV. What Process Is Due in Clemeng- Proceedings?
In Woodard, the Court held only that "minimal procedural safeguards"
applied in capital clemency proceedings. 9 The Court, however, did not discuss
exactly what procedures were required. 0 There are two sources to which one can
turn in order to determine what process must be afforded an inmate in clemency
proceedings: the Ohio clemency scheme that the Court tacitly approved in
Woodard and the way in which the Court has defined "the most basic elements of
fair procedure" in other contexts."1
A. Ohio's Clemengy Scheme
The Ohio clemency scheme "approved" in Woodard consisted of several
important steps. First, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority ("OAPA") must con-
duct a "thorough investigation." 2 Second, "if a stay has not yet been issued,
[OAPA] must schedule a clemency hearing 45 days before an execution for a date
approximately 21 days in advance of the execution."53 Third, "[OAPA] must also
48. Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, No. 95-4099,1998 WL 279363 (6th Cir. May
20, 1998) (on remand from Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (1998)).
49. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment). See also Id at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
50. The Court also left another important question unanswered in Woodard What is the
appropriate standard of judicial review of the process afforded inmates in clemency proceedings?
To date only one court, the Ninth Circuit, has discussed this issue. See Woratzeck v. Arizona Board
of Executive Clemency, 117 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1997). As a preliminary matter in Woratqeck, the
Ninth Circuit determined that minimal due process protections apply in clemency proceedings.
Worat!Zeck, 117 F.3d at 404 (citing favorably Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 107 F.3d
1178 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (1998)). The court of appeals then turned to the question
of whether the clemency proceeding at issue violated procedural due process. In its discussion of
this issue, the court stated that "a procedural due process violation exists only if the Board's
procedures 'shock the conscience."' Id Similarly, the dissenting judge in Otgy v. Stenberg also
advocated a "shocks the conscience" standard of review for clemency procedures. Otey v.
Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635,640 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson,J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952), and reasoning that substantive due process applied to clemency
proceedings). Utilization of this standard for reviewing clemency procedures is appropriate under
the Supreme Court's decision in Woodard This standard strikes the appropriate balance between
preservation of the executive power to grant or deny clemency and the protection of the inmate's
constitutional right to due process of law in clemency proceedings. Obviously, the "shocks the
conscience" standard, as articulated in Woratteck, presupposes that some process is being afforded.
A total lack of process would surely "shock the conscience." This is precisely the problem with the
clemency schemes in the eleven states, including Virginia, that guaranty no process whatsoever. See
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Due to the fact that these states offer absolutely no
process, their clemency schemes undoubtedly "shock the conscience."
51. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
52. OHIo REV. CODE § 2967.07 (1998).
53. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor J., concurring in part & concurring in the judg-
ment).
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advise the prisoner that he is entitled to a pre-hearing interview with one or more
parole board members."'  Thus, every death row inmate in Ohio who seeks
executive clemency is guaranteed an investigation of his or her case for clemency,
a hearing before OAPA, and a personal interview with one or more OAPA
members.
The guarantees of notice and a hearing to Ohio inmates were especially
important to Justice O'Connor's determination of the case in Woodard. She
reasoned that the "process [Woodard] received, including notice of the heating and an
opportunity to partipate in an interiew, comports with... whatever limitations the
Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceedings.""5 It is not at all clear
that Justice O'Connor would have found the requirements of due process
satisfied in the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard. It is arguable,
therefore, that any clemency scheme that fails to guaranty inmates notice and an
opportunity to be heard, in the form of some type of hearing, violates due
process. This conclusion is supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court in
other contexts.
B. The Fundamentals of Due Process: An Opportunity to be Heard and an
Impartial Decision Maker
Several Supreme Court decisions regarding the requirements of procedural
due process in other contexts also provide some very important insight into what
process is due in clemency proceedings. The most complete discussion of what
procedures comprise the "fundamentals of due process" can be foundin Goldberg
v. Kel] 6 and Mathews v. Eldidge.7 These two cases discussed the process required
when the government desired to terminate an individual's welfare or social
security benefits, respectively.
In Goldberg, the Court considered the narrow issue of "whether the Due
Process Clause requires that the recipient [of welfare benefits] be afforded an
evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefit" and, if so, what procedures
did due process require.5 " After determining that a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing was required, the Court considered what "minimum procedural safe-
guards" 9 were required in these proceedings. According to the Goldberg Court,
54. Id. (O'Connor J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment). At this voluntary
interview, the inmate is not entitled to have his attorney present. The Court unanimously held that
this arrangement did not violate the inmate's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id at 1252-
1253 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
55. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added).
56. 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970).
57. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976).
58. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,260,90 S.Ct. 1011, 1016 (1970).
59. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267,90 S.Ct. at 1020. The term used by Justice Brennan in Goldberg,
"minimal procedural safeguards," is the exact same term employed by Justice O'Connor in Woodard
to describe what due process requires in clemency proceedings. See Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1254
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
1998]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1
the Due Process Clause required, at a minimum, an opportunity to be heard" and
an impartial decision maker." The Court's decision in Mathews, regarding what
process was due in a post-termination hearing on social security disability bene-
fits, echoed its holding in Goldberg.2 Each of these requirements is discussed in
detail below.
60. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267,90 S.Ct. at 1020 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394,
34 S.Ct. 779, 783 (1914)).
61. Id at 271, 90 S.Ct. at 1022 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955) &
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,45-46, 70 S.Ct. 445,451-452 (1950)).
62. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 n.4 and 348-349, 96 S.Ct. 893, 898 n.4 and 909
(1976) (quoting Goldber, 397 U.S. at 266-71,90 S.Ct. at 1019-22, stating that due process required an
"impartial decisionmaker," and stating that the "essence of due process is the requirement that 'a
person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet
it."' (quoting Joint Anti-Facist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 646 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). InMahews, the Court also established a three-part balancing test for
determining whether additional or substitute procedural safeguards are required in a given situation.
The three factors to consider are as follows: (1) "The private interest that will be affected by the
official action;" (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and (3) "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substantive procedural requirement would entail." Id at 335,96 S.Ct. at 903. Based
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Woodard, it is not necessary to conduct a Mathews balancing to
determine what process is due. The Court held that the Due Process Clause applies to clemency
proceedings and approved the Ohio clemency scheme as satisfying due process requirements. In so
doing, the Court arguably established Ohio's procedures as the base-line model for clemency
procedures and did so without any consideration of a cost-benefit analysis such as that in Mathews.
Even if a Mathews balancing were required, however, the scales would tip in favor of more process
rather than less. First, the private interest affected, the deprivation of the inmate's life, is extraordi-
narily important and substantial. Second, in light of the need for "individualized decisions in capital
cases," there is a risk that, without proper demency procedures, inmates who are either factually not
guilty, or at least not guilty of the death penalty, will be executed. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so pro-
foundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized
decision is essential in capital cases."). See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96
S.Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976) ("This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death
is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death,in its finality, differs
more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.") Cf. Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12, 113 S.Ct. 853, 866 (1993) (describing executive clemency as the "fail
safe" of the capital punishment process which is used to hear claims of, among other things, actual
innocence after judicial avenues have been exhausted). Further, requiring some "procedure" in
clemency proceedings, be it additionalprocedure or substitute procedure,would have value. Itwould
help ensure, for one final time, that the inmate actually deserves to die at the hands of the state.
Finally, the state's interest in preserving state fiscal and administrative resources is insufficient to
overcome the inmate's substantial private interest in continued life. See Goldber, 397 U.S. at 265-66,
90 S.Ct. at 1019-20 (holding that state's interest in preserving fiscal and administrative resources is
insufficient to overcome the private interest in continuing to receive welfare benefits [a substantially
lesser private interest than the interest in life itself]). Most states will only have to conduct clemency
proceedings a few times a year. In 1997, for example there were 74 executions in the 40 jurisdictions
with the death penalty, an average of 1.85 executions per jurisdiction. In the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions, the fiscal and administrative burdens, if any, will be fairly slight. Thus, the Mathews balancing,
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1. Opportunity to be Heard
According to the Supreme Court in Goldberg, '[t]hefundamental requisite of due
process is the opportunity to be heard."'' 3 The "hearing must be 'at a meaningful
time and [conducted] in a meaningful manner."" Further, the "opportunity to
be heard must be tailored to the capacities of those who are to be heard."6 5 The
Court stated that "[i]t is not enough that [one] may present his position to the
decision maker in writing."66 It reasoned that "written submissions do not afford
the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit [one] to mold his argu-
ment to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important." '67 Addi-
tionally, the Court stated that "where credibility and veracity are at issue []
written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. 68 The Court
went on to state that "where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due
process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses;" 69 and that the individual must be allowed to present his case through
retained counsel if he so desires.7"
The various "minimal procedural safeguards"71 discussed by the Court in
Goldbeq in the context of welfare termination hearings apply with equal force to
clemency hearings. First, the private interest that is at stake in clemency proceed-
ings, the life of the inmate, is much more substantial than the property "right"
at issue in Goldberg. It is very important in clemency proceedings to allow the
inmate every opportunity to convince the Governor or the board that he or she
does not deserve to die, for whatever reason. In many clemency proceedings, the
credibility and veracity of the inmate will undoubtedly be critical. If, for example,
the inmate is asserting that he or she has undergone a complete religious "re-
birth," the question of his or her veracity may very well constitute the entire basis
of decision. If there are adverse witnesses, the inmate should be allowed to cross
examine them in order to best present his or her case for clemency. And cer-
even if it were necessary, tips in favor of additional procedural safeguards in clemency proceedings.
63. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267,90 S.Ct. at 1020 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394,
34 S.Ct. 779, 783 (1914)) (emphasis added). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729
(1975) (holding that students facing temporary suspension from public school were entitled to
protection under the Due Process Clause and that due process required, in connection with
suspensions of up to ten days, that such a student be given notice of charges and an opportunity
to present his version to authorities, face-to-face, preferably prior to removal from school).
64. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267,90 S.Ct. at 1020 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)). The Court's use of the word "hearing" indicates that some sort of face-to-face meeting
is required. Simply being allowed to submit the application for clemency is wholly insufficient to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of an "opportunity to be heard."
65. Id at 268-69, 90 S.Ct. at 1021.
66. Id at 269, 90 S.Ct. at 1021.
67. Id
68. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269, 90 S.Ct. at 1021.
69. Id
70. Id. at 270, 90 S.Ct. at 1022.
71. Id. at 267, 90 S.Ct. at 1020.
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tainly, the inmate should be allowed to retain counsel at his last opportunity to
avoid execution. Under the rationale of Goldberg, it is apparent that clemency
proceedings must include a personal "hearing" of some sort. Clemency proce-
dures that only guaranty an inmate's ability to submit a written request are
"wholly unsatisfactory" and violative of due process.7 2
As previously discussed, the Ohio clemency scheme approved ir, Woodard
guaranteed applicants three things: an investigation, an informal interview, and
a hearing before OAPA."3 The guarantees of notice and hearing to Ohio inmates
were especially important to Justice O'Connor's determination of the case in
Woodard. She reasoned that the "process [Woodard] received, including notice of the
bearing and an opportuniy to particpate in an interview, comports with... whatever
limitations the Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceedings." 74 It
is not at all clear that Justice O'Connor would have found the requirements of
due process satisfied in the absence of notice and an opportunity to participate
in a hearing and an interview.
The clemency scheme used by the Commonwealth of Virginia is constitu-
tionally infirm on its face because it does not guaranty those who apply for
executive clemency an opportunity to be heard in any meaningful way. Not
only does it fail to require a hearing on the merits of every application for
clemency as required by Goldberg, it requires absolutely no action by anyone on
the application. Virginia's clemency scheme does not even guaranty that anyone
will look at the application and consider its merit. In short, Virginia's clemency
scheme guarantees inmates absolutely no process whatsoever. In light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Woodard and the description of the minimum
requirements of due process in Goldber Virginia's clemency scheme, on its face,
fails to meet the minimum requirements of due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
2. Impartial Decision Maker
The Court stated in both Goldberg and Matthews that "an impartial decision
maker is essential" under the Due Process Clause.76 The Court made a similar
observation in Morrissgy v. Brewer77 wherein it stated that one of the "minimum
72. Id at 269, 90 S.Ct. at 1021.
73. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
74. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 1254 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
75. See VA. CODE § 53.1-231 (1998). In Virginia, the Virginia Parole Board may investigate
an application for clemency either at the Governor's request or of its own accord if "it believes
action on the part of the Governor is in the best interest of the Commonwealth." However, the
Governor may not delegate the actual clemency decision to the Virginia Parole Board.
76. Goldbe,% 397 U.S. at 271,90 S.Ct. at 1022 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct.
623 (1955) & Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-46, 70 S.Ct. 445, 451-452 (1950)); &
Mathews v. Ednedge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 n.4, 96 S.Ct. 893, 898 n.4 (1976) (quoting Goldber& 397 U.S.
at 266-71, 90 S.Ct. at 1019-22, and stating that due process required an "impartial decisionmaker").
77. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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requirements of due process" in a parole revocation hearing was "a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body.""8 This requirement is rooted in the basic tenet that a
"fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." '79 As the Court
stated in In re Murchison,° "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness"'" and that in order "to perform its high
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'8 2 It is
therefore beyond dispute that an "impartial decision maker" is a basic and
fundamental requirement of due process.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Woodard, several death row inmates
seeking executive clemency claimed that they were denied due process because
they were denied an impartial decision maker.8 3 These claims were based on the
fact that at least one of the persons who had the ultimate power to grant or deny
clemency acted as the Attorney General of the state during the pendency of many
of the inmates' appeals. In deciding these cases, each of which is discussed
below, the courts determined at the outset that due process protection did not
apply to capital clemency proceedings under Dumschat."
The first court to discuss this issue was the United States District Court for
the District of Arkansas in Pickens v. Tucker."5 In Pickens, the inmate, Edward
Charles Pickens, brought a complaint for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that his "federal constitutional rights [were] abrogated because Governor [Jim
78. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,488-89 (1972).
79. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,136 (1955) (holding that in a contempt proceeding arising
out of testimony before a "one-man grand jury," the judge who "served as the 'one-man grand jury'
out of which the contempt charges arose" could not, consistent with "the due process requirement
of an impartial tribunal," sit as the trial judge in the contempt trial).
80. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
81. In reMurrhison, 349 U.S. at 136.
82. Id. (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,14 (1954)) (emphasis added). The Court
also stated that .'[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as
a judge [ ] not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the
latter due process of law."' Id. (citing Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
83. See Buchanan v. Gilmore, 139 F.3d 982 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that, in light of the fact
that the Due Process Clause does not apply to clemency proceedings, inmate was not deprived of
any constitutionally protected right by the fact that the Governor of Virginia, the person with the
ultimate power to grant or deny clemency, served as Attorney General of Virginia during the
pendency of most of the inmate's appeals); Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that in light of the fact that the Due Process Clause does not apply to clemency proceedings, inmate
was not deprived of any constitutionally protected right by the fact that the acting Attorney General
of Nebraska, who represented the state in majority of the inmate's appeals, is one of three members
of the Nebraska Board of Pardons, the body with the ultimate power to grant or deny clemency);
Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark.), aft'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that,
in light of the fact that the Due Process Clause does not apply to clemency proceedings, inmate was
not deprived of any constitutionally protected right by the fact that the Governor of Arkansas, the
person with the ultimate power to grant or deny clemency, served as Attorney General of Arkansas
during the pendency of most of the inmate's appeals).
84. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
85. 851 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark.), aftd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Guy] Tucker [could ]not be impartial or objective" in ruling on his clemency
application. Tucker was formerly the Attorney General of Arkansas and "partic-
ipated in the early appellate review of [Pickens's] conviction." 6  The court
quickly disposed of Pickens's due process claim by invoking Dumschat and stating
that "the [Arkansas clemency] statute [did] not create a protected interest in
clemency" and thus, the Due Process Clause was not triggered. The court also
invoked the "Rule of Necessity" saying that, under Amendment 6, § 4 of the
Arkansas Constitution, if the Governor is in the state of Arkansas and "in full
possession of his faculties" then the Lieutenant Governor cannot make clemency
decisions.8 7
Following its affirmation of the district court in Pickens,"5 the Eighth Circuit
again addressed whether or not an impartial decisionmaker is required in clem-
ency proceedings in Otey v. Stenberg.9 In this case, Otey asserted that his constitu-
tional rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the presence of the Attorney
General of Nebraska on the Nebraska Board of Pardons, the body with the
authority to grant or deny clemency.9" Again, the Eight Circuit simply invoked
the Supreme Court's decision in Dumschat and stated that "[d]ue process never
attached to the Nebraska clemency proceedings." '91 Thus, the court held that
Otey was not deprived of any constitutionally protected interest by the Attorney
General's inclusion on the Board of Pardons.
92
86. Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Ark. 1994). Under Arkansas law, "the
sole pardoning power is vested in the Governor under Article 6, § 18, of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion." Pickens, 851 F. Supp. at 365. Arkansas law also requires the Post Prison Transfer Board to
investigate every application for clemency. ARK. CODE § 16-93-204 (1997).
87. Pickens, 851 F. Supp. at 365-66.
88. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court in Pickens and remanded for a determination of Governor Tucker's
ability to be impartial. Pickens v. Tucker, No. 94-2103EA, 1994 WL 248207 (8th Cir. May 10,1994).
The Eighth Circuit, however, sitting en banc reversed the panel's decision and affirmed the district
court.
89. 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994).
90. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994). Under Nebraska law, the clemency
power is vested in the Nebraska Board of Pardons. The Board has three members: the Governor,
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. NEB. CONST. art. TV, § 13. The clemency
procedures used in Nebraska merely require "consideration" of the application by the board. There
is no right to a hearing or to any personal appearance by the inmate. Oty, 34 F.3d at 638.
91. Oty, 34 F.3d at 637. The court of appeals rejected Otey's equal protection claim as well.
Its discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, however, that there
may be a viable equal protection claim involved in future cases on this issue. The dissenting judge
in Pickens framed the equal protection issue as follows: "The petitioner is asserting that he does not,
as a practical matter, have the same access to a state-created process as people with respect to whom
the governor has no bias." Pickens v. Tucker, 23 F.3d 1477,1478 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Arnold,
J., dissenting). In WoodardJustice Stevens also acknowledged that an Equal Protection claim could
exist in some situations. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 1255 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
92. Oty, 34 F.3d at 637. Thus, the Eight Circuit rejected Otey's procedural due process
argument. It also went on to reject Otey's substantive due process argument as well.
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just one week before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Woodard, the
Fourth Circuit decided Buchanan v. Gilmore.93 Five days before his scheduled
execution, Douglas McArthur Buchanan filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against GovernorJames S. Gilmore, III." In this action, Buchanan alleged
that "inasmuch as the Governor served as Attorney General of Virginia in prior
proceedings concerning his case, he is disqualified by a conflict of interest from
considering his clemency application." '95 Without any reasoning of its own or any
explanation for its decision, the Fourth Circuit cited Pickens v. Tucker and dis-
missed the action.96 Thus, it can only be assumed that the Fourth Circuit be-
lieved that no due process protections apply in capital clemency proceedings.9 7
The holdings in all of these cases rested on the basic premise that no due
process protections apply in clemency proceedings. This view is no longer valid
in light of the Court's decision in Woodard. The Court made clear "that some
minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. 98 One of the
"minimal procedural safeguards" required by the Due Process Clause is an
impartial decision maker.99
In Virginia the requirement of an impartial decision maker is especially
important. The current governor, James S. Gilmore, III, served previously as
Attorney General of Virginia. As Attorney General, Governor Gilmore repre-
93. 139 F.3d 982 (4th Cir. 1998). See also Case Note on Buchanan v. Gilmore, 11 CAP. DEF.J.
73 (1998).
94. Buchanan v. Gilmore, 139 F.3d 982, 983 (4th Cir. 1998).
95. Buchanan, 139 F.3d at 983.
96. Id at 984.
97. The Fourth Circuit apparently cited Pickens for the proposition that the "Rule of Neces-
sity" applies when the clemency authority is vested solely in the Governor. Presumably, the court
concluded that Governor Gilmore was not "unable to discharge the power[ ] and dut[y] of his
office" in considering Buchanan's clemency application because no due process protections attach
to clemency proceedings under Dumschat. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 16. This conclusion is not accurate
after the Supreme Court's decision in Woodard Now that the Court has stated that the Due Process
Clause does apply, an impartial decision maker is required. Thus, Governor Gilmore would be
"unable to discharge the power[ ] and dut[y] of his office" in clemency proceedings and the
Lieutenant Governor should consider clemency applications pursuant to Article V, section 16 of
the Constitution of Virginia.
98. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 1254 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in the judgment). See also Woodard, 118 S.Ct. at 1255 (Stevens,J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).
99. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 (1970) (stating that under
the Due Process Clause, "an impartial decision maker is essential"). The judge who dissented from
the panel's decision in Pickens admitted as much when he stated that if procedural due process
applied to clemency proceedings, then "Mathews v. Eldridge sets forth procedural due process
requirements [which] include: 'an impartial decisionmaker."' Pickens v. Tucker, No. 94-2103EA,
1994 WL 248207 (8th Cir. May 10, 1994) (Beam, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See alo Pickens
v. Tucker, 23 F.3d 1477, 1478 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (stating that "an
impartial decision-maker is a fundamental requirement of due process and citing Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)); & Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635,640-42 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson, S.J.,




sented the Commonwealth in opposing the appeals and habeas petitions of many
of the inmates who will be seeking clemency in the next two years. Additionally,
Gilmore served as Commonwealth's Attorney for Henrico County from 1987
until 1993.
It may be possible for the Commonwealth to argue in rebuttal that there is
no evidence that Governor Gilmore would not decide any application for
clemency in a fair and impartial manner. Senior Judge Gibson of the Eighth
Circuit countered this argument very effectively in his dissent in Otey v. Stenberg.
The attorney general, having successfully obtained affirmance ofOtey's death
sentence in the Nebraska Supreme Court, and successfully represented the
State in Otey's habeas case, can hardly be expected to oppose the execution
of this sentence. As prosecutor, the attorney general determined that it
served the public welfare to seek the death penalty as the appropriate punish-
ment for Otey. It is unreasonable to assume that the attorney general would
freely consider the same sentence inappropriate at a clemency hearing.... "
Judge Gibson's analysis applies with equal force to situations such as the one in
Virginia. Based on the due process requirement of an impartial decision maker,
the Governor should be deemed unable to consider the clemency applications
of those inmates whose trials or appeals were conducted during his term as
Attorney General. The Lieutenant Governor should make these determinations
in light of the Governor's inability to do so."°"
V. Conclusions
The Supreme Court's decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodardwas
long overdue. For far too long, death row inmates in Virginia and elsewhere
have been denied basic procedural safeguards in their final attempt to avoid the
execution chamber. Hopefully, Woodard will force states to adopt procedures
similar to those used in Ohio - procedures that adequately protect the rights of
death row inmates.
Even if more "process" in clemency proceedings does not result in a single
additional grant of clemency, the system as a whole will benefit. In our legal
system "'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.""02 By requiring states to
guaranty inmates a hearing and an impartial decision maker in clemency proceed-
ings, courts and legislatures will help ensure that the appearance of justice is
satisfied and that only the worst of the worst are put to death. The Constitution
requires it and justice demands it.
100. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson, S.J., dissenting).
101. VA. CONST art V,§ 16.
102. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954)) (emphasis added).
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